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Abstract: 
Is it possible to combat global climate change through North-to-South technology transfer 
even without a global climate treaty? Or do carbon leakage and the rebound effect imply 
that it is possible to take advantage of technological improvements under the umbrella of a 
global arrangement only? For answering these questions a world with full international co-
operation is compared with a world, where countries act non-cooperatively. More precisely, 
in case of non-cooperation two cases are discussed. The first one is called Kyoto-plus and the 
second one labeled Kyoto-reversed. Kyoto-plus means that the North decides: (1) to unilate-
rally reduce its domestic greenhouse gas emissions and (2), to transfer technological know-
ledge to the South. If Kyoto-reversed is considered, the North decides on transferring tech-
nology while the South commits itself to reduce emissions. Rebound and leakage effects 
hinder a sustainable and welfare improving solution of the climate problem. 
  
                                                 
1  Financial support by the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research on Climate (NCCR Climate) as 
well as the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research on Trade Regulations (NCCR Trade) funded by 
the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) is gratefully acknowledged. Helpful comments have been pro-
vided by Benjamin Hecker. 
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1 Introduction 
The last COP meeting in December 2011 at Durban once again has demonstrated that the 
world society presently is unable to establish an international agreement on greenhouse gas 
abatement, which extends the existing Kyoto Protocol. This has redirected the discussion to 
the role, the development, the implementation and the transfer of technologies can play in 
combating global warming. One reason is that technology transfer can be successfully 
achieved through bilateral arrangements and does not need full international cooperation. A 
second one is that new technologies are at core in fighting the threat of climate change. Any 
stabilization of the atmospheric carbon concentration at levels below catastrophic ones re-
quires eliminating carbon emissions almost completely within the next two centuries (see 
IPCC, 2001), and the most effective way to de-carbonize the world economy is to develop 
and to use climate-friendly technologies. These could include improvements in energy effi-
ciency, but also advanced technologies for generating electricity or carbon capturing and 
sequestration (CCS). 
Today, the potential for inventing more energy-efficient and climate-related technologies is 
highest in industrialized countries, but the need for such technologies is most urgent in the 
developing world and the fast growing economies of Asia and Latin America. The Energy 
Information Administration (2011) projects that by 2035 carbon emissions of non-OECD 
countries will exceed those of the OECD member states by more than 100%, while technolo-
gical innovations still will occur in a few, highly industrialized countries only. Not surprisingly, 
a large number of both scientific and political commentaries, among which the U.S. during 
the Bush administration was the most prominent one, advocate the transfer of technologies 
from the developed to the developing world. 
In a study, which covers the period from 1998 to 2003 and uses patent counts to measure 
both the output and the international transfer of technologies, Dechezlepretre et al. (2011)2
                                                 
2  The authors argue that patent counts from the EPO/OECD World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) are 
the only indicator available today that provides a comprehensive view on innovation and technology diffu-
sion on a global scale. 
 
found that the majority of technology transfers is between the developed countries. North-
to-South transfers account for less than 20 % of all, while South-to-South transfers are al-
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most inexistent. This suggests a huge potential for extending North-to-South transfers fur-
ther. But what are the effects of transferring technologies from the industrialized countries 
to the developing ones on global emissions and regional welfare? And under which circums-
tances does the North have an incentive at all for transferring technologies? Answering 
these questions for a world, where technology transfer from North to the South is combined 
either with unilateral climate policies or full cooperation in the solution of the global climate 
problem is at the center of this analysis.3
For more than twenty years the economic literature discusses how the transfer of technolo-
gies can be helpful in avoiding the adverse effects of global climate change. Some papers 
take trade aspects into account (for an overview, see Copeland and Taylor, 2004). This is of 
particular importance, since international transfers such as providing technical assistance for 
coping with climate change, can lead to what is called a transfer paradox (see Takarada, 
2005). Lee (2001) for example discloses such a paradox in the sense that, despite of the 
transfer, the industrialized donor gains economic welfare while the recipient developing 
country loses welfare. Terms-of-trade deterioration is the principal reason for such a result 
as is recognized since the pioneering work of Bhagwati et al. (1983). 
  
A part of the extensive literature on the provision of public goods also discusses the issue of 
technology transfer, typically within a strategic framework, where trade issues are neg-
lected. Two papers are of particular interest. Buchholz and Konrad (1994) analyze at which 
level technological transfers will be realized under either cooperative or non-cooperative 
environmental policies. They show that if the countries with the inferior technology adopt an 
improved one, the quality of the environment might deteriorate nonetheless. Stranlund 
(1996) considers the case where the level of the technology transfer is chosen in the first 
stage, and abatement activities are non-cooperatively determined in the second one. As a 
result, both the quality of the global environment and the welfare of the donor country are 
improved. 
                                                 
3  We are not discussing the aspect of incentive compatibility of technology transfers for participation and 
compliance in climate change mitigation. For a discussion, see Barrett (2006), or, in the more general con-
text of adaptation funding, Buob and Stephan (2012). 
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A third strand of literature applies Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models for analyz-
ing numerically the effects of technology transfers. Much of this literature bases on the work 
of Yang (1999) as well as Nordhaus and Yang (2006) and applies some variant of the RICE 
model of integrated assessment of global climate change (see Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). 
Mostly the results reported sound encouraging. Recently, Aronsson et al. (2010) showed: If 
the countries of the South are free of obligations for curbing greenhouse gas emissions, then 
both the North and the South will profit from technology transfers through a better envi-
ronment and higher welfare. A closer look on these analyses reveals that carbon energy is 
not an input into production and technological change has no effect other than reducing 
costs of greenhouse gas abatement. As such transferring technology diminishes the cost-of-
abatement differential across regions and allows for abating greenhouse gases more effi-
ciently. This explains why from the perspective of the North technology transfer is motivated 
even if transfer costs are non-negligible.4
Technology transfer is not only a mean for lowering abatement costs. It can also contribute 
to economic growth, for example through increasing the energy-efficiency of production. 
Data on the transfer of patents show that between 1978 and 2003 the share of climate-
related patents always stood below 2% of the total (see Dechezlepretre et al., 2011). The 
majority of transfers applied to patents on more energy efficient technologies. This moti-
vates a first point of departure from the existing literature on technology transfers and 
greenhouse gas mitigation. We explicitly include carbon energy into our framework and con-
sider the North-to-South transfer of more energy-efficient technologies. However, increasing 
the energy efficiency through using more efficient technologies can let greenhouse gas 
emissions rise (see Brännlund et al., 2007). The intuition is that improvements in energy effi-
ciency create an income effect through which demand for energy is stipulated. Or to phrase 
it differently, efficiency gains wipe out the emission reductions, and hence, a “rebound ef-
fect” occurs. 
 
                                                 
4  The importance of cost-efficiency is acknowledged in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Article 3.3 states that climate policy should “ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”. 
One way to increase cost-efficiency is the transfer of technologies at least as long as there are cost differen-
tials between Annex I and non-Annex I countries (see Aronsson et al., 2010).  
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Most of the literature on technological change and the provision of public goods, which is 
relevant in our context, does not consider international trade. However, since technological 
change affects the demand for carbon energy and hence the terms-of-trade, which in turn 
has an impact of welfare, trade in carbon energy should be explicitly taken into account. This 
motivates the second point of departure from the existing literature. We assume that carbon 
energy, which includes oil, gas and coal mainly, is traded on a single integrated world mar-
ket.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework. 
It is kept deliberately simple, but covers international trade in carbon energy as well as 
North-to South transfer of more energy-efficient technologies. Section 3 discusses two poss-
ible states of the world: one, where regions do not cooperate in the solution of the global 
climate problem, but unilaterally decide on climate policies and technology transfers; one, 
where regions fully cooperate and simultaneously decide on Pareto-efficient mitigation poli-
cies. It is shown that rebound and leakage effects hinder a sustainable and welfare improv-
ing solution of the climate problem. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 However, if there is international trade in carbon energy and other energy-intensive 
basic materials, carbon leakage can occur. For example, unilateral greenhouse gas abate-
ment in one region can because of terms-of-trade effects let the unconstraint region in-
crease its imports of carbon energy and hence emit more than it would otherwise (for a dis-
cussion, see Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins, 2000). 
2 Getting started: a simple static model 
To fix ideas, let the world be divided into two regions. For vividness they will be called North 
and South. North (N) consists of the OECD countries plus the former Soviet Union. Roughly, 
this corresponds to the ANNEX I parties. South (S) covers the rest of the world, hence in-
cludes those countries, which the Kyoto Protocol exempts from the duty of greenhouse gas 
abatement. 
Each region n = N,S produces a homogenous output which can be consumed domestically 
and can be used to cover costs of energy supply. To keep considerations as simple as possi-
                                                 
5   Of course this is an oversimplification of reality. It is inspired, however, by Nordhaus´ (2009) observation 
that there is only a single, integrated world market for oil.  
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ble, technological knowledge and carbon energy are the only inputs into regional produc-
tion. Formally, for each region n gross domestic production (GDP) is characterized by the 
function , where the region’s energy inputs  are measured in carbon equivalents 
to energy consumption, hence directly govern the emissions of greenhouse gases such as 
carbon dioxide.  denotes the region’s stock of technological knowledge and rules the 
energy efficiency of regional production. This implies in particular that the innovation of new 
technologies can increase the energy efficiency and/or might reduce the carbon intensity of 
domestic production. This is nothing else than saying that each region can influence welfare 
through investing into technological knowledge as well as by investing into environmental 
capital through greenhouse gas mitigation. 
Technological knowledge is different from other inputs such as raw materials, energy, labor 
or physical capital. To capture some of its essential features let us assume (see Gillingham et 
al., 2007): 
(1) Once installed in a region, technological knowledge is a non-rival input into regional 
production, and hence can be applied as often as desired.6
Given that regional production is linear homogenous in energy this implies 
 
(2.1)  . 
(2) Technological knowledge is appropriable to the single region. 
That means, regions have the ability to capture all benefits derived from inventing technolo-
gies and can exclude other regions from using that technology. This implies that transferring 
technologies requires a policy decision. 
(3) Technology transfer is costless. 
                                                 
6  For example, once the laws of thermodynamics, which form the scientific basis of any combustion engine, 
have been discovered, they can be applied as often as desired. This discriminates technological knowledge 
from human capital. In the latter case knowledge is inherently tied to a person, hence can be used only, if 
that person is present (see Romer, 1990). 
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Typically, transferring technologies causes costs. Examples are costs of installation and main-
tenance, costs to modify existing technologies and to make the new ones appropriate for 
use in the recipient’s economy. However, since we are interested on the strategic interac-
tion between mitigation and technology transfers, for sake of simplicity it is assumed in the 
following that new technologies are transferred free of costs.  
Carbon energy is produced in both regions and is traded on an open international market. 
Therefore, if  denotes the supply of region n, the world energy market is in equilibrium, if  
(2.2)  .  
Carbon energy is Janus-faced. The more energy is put into production, the higher is the do-
mestic output, but simultaneously, the higher are greenhouse gas emissions. This drives 
global climate change, which is a public bad and negatively affects regional welfare. 
In principle, there are two categories of climate change impacts. On the one hand there are 
impacts which can directly be measured in terms of output losses. For example, in the case 
of agriculture prices exist, which allow assigning market values to these output losses. Con-
sequently, these impacts are termed market damages. On the other hand there are so-called 
non-market damages, such as species losses or catastrophic changes in the ocean currents, 
which cannot be directly expressed in terms of a national accounting system (see Manne and 
Stephan, 2005).  
This paper concentrates on market damage of climate change only. Or to phrase it different-
ly, impacts of climate change materialize in losses of regional gross production. Therefore, 
let , with  and , denote the regional climate damage factor, 
which is a function of global emissions and measures the fraction of conventional domestic 
output that is at disposal in region n. That means, the more carbon energy is consumed 
world-wide, the higher is the stock of globally accumulated greenhouse gas emissions, and 
hence, the lower will be the fraction of conventional wealth that is available to region n. The 
remaining fraction  is called green GDP. 
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In each region n green GDP has to cover: (1) regional consumption , (2) costs of energy 
supply, which are a strictly increasing function  of regional energy output  and 
which are measured in units of domestic GDP, and (3) potential deficits from trading carbon 
energy. That means   
(2.3)  , 
where p denotes the world market price of carbon energy.  
3 Analysis 
In the following, let us consider two possible states of the world: one, where regions do not 
cooperate in the solution of the global climate problem, but act as if they were Nash players, 
who unilaterally decide on climate policies and technology transfers; one, where regions 
fully cooperate and simultaneously decide on Pareto-efficient mitigation policies. 
3.1 Unilateral climate policies and North-to-South technology transfers 
In case of non-cooperation we discuss two cases. The first one is called Kyoto-plus, and re-
flects a situation as proposed by the European Union, where the North tightness its emission 
targets and supplies technologies to the South. The second one is called Kyoto-reversed and 
reflects a state of the world, where the South no longer is free of obligations to curb green-
house gas emissions. I.e., not only more energy-efficient technologies, but also the duty of 
greenhouse gas abatement is shifted from North to South. In both cases a non-cooperative 
2-stage game is employed. Kyoto-plus (Section 3.1.1) means that in stage 1 the North de-
cides: (1) to unilaterally reduce its domestic greenhouse gas emissions and (2), to transfer 
technological knowledge to the South. In stage 2 the South chooses its welfare maximizing 
inputs of carbon energy into regional production. If Kyoto-reversed (Section 3.1.2) is consi-
dered, in stage 1 the North decides on transferring technology, while the South commits 
itself to reduce emissions in stage 2. 
As usual, sub-game perfect equilibria are obtained through backward induction. That means, 
given the decisions of the first stage, in the second one, regions independently maximize 
welfare. Therefore, before analyzing the two cases separately, let us first consider some 
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properties, which generally follow, if regions maximize welfare without reflecting that their 
decision affects the welfare of the other region. Since by assumption climate change directly 
affects production and not utilities, regional consumption (see (2.3)) can be viewed as proxy 
of regional welfare, i.e., in case of non-cooperation regions independently solve the problem 
 . 
Necessary conditions for an interior solution are 
(3.1)  , 
(3.2)  . 
Condition (3.2) indicates: (1) regional supply of carbon energy  is a strictly increasing 
function of price p, and (2), in equilibrium marginal costs of energy supply are identical 
across regions. Condition (3.1) reflects that changing unilaterally the input of carbon energy 
has two opposite effects. On the one hand it affects the regions’ marginal productivity of 
energy and it has an impact on the marginal damages of climate change on the other. 
Now, since from condition (3.1) follows 
(3.3)   
The left side implies that in optimum the marginal green productivity of carbon energy, 
, has to be bigger than marginal damages, , measured in absolute terms. The 
right side implies  
  , 
which means that in equilibrium the elasticity of regional climate damages has to be bigger 
than -1. Or to phrase it differently: the percentage change in climate damages has to be 
smaller than the percentage change in energy consumption. 
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Condition (3.1) implicitly defines the regional demand for carbon energy  as function of 
the world market price p, demand  of the other region and the regional technology stock 
, i.e., . Taking the total differential gives 
  . 
The first term represents the price effect, the second one is the leakage effect and the last 
one indicates that there might be a rebound effect. 
Because of condition (2.1), the price effect is negative,  
(3.4)  . 
Hence the demand for carbon energy will decrease, if world markets prices rise ceteris pari-
bus. The second term is determined by  
(3.5)  , 
which obviously implies 
  . 
That means, if the other region reduces the input of carbon energy, then the region under 
consideration reacts by extending its inputs of carbon energy into production, but by less 
than full degree. This indicates leakage. 
Finally, note that 
(3.6)   
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is positive as follows from condition (3.3). In other words, due to an increase in energy effi-
ciency more energy will be used as input into production and hence a rebound effect is ob-
served.  
3.1.1 Kyoto-plus 
The Kyoto-plus scenario assumes that in the first stage the North simultaneously decides on 
own mitigation and technology transfers. I.e., at beginning of stage 2 technology transfers 
, which are measured as changes of the South’s technology stock, as well as changes in 
the North’s input of carbon energy, , are given. Hence, condition (3.1) together with the 
market clearance condition (2.2) after some manipulations (see Appendix) determine the 
following system of linear equations, which characterizes the South´s decision problem in 
stage 2: 
(3.7)  . 
By using Cramer’s rule we get 
(3.8)  , 
(3.9)   
As condition (3.8) demonstrates, both North-to-South technology transfer and unilateral 
climate policy affect the world market price of carbon energy, but overall effects are not 
clear. (1) The numerator of the first term on the right side corresponds to the net impact, 
changing energy consumption in the North has on prices. Since , it is positive, 
and hence, world market prices ceteris paribus will fall, if the North decides reducing its in-
puts of carbon energy. (2) The numerator of the second term on the right side reflects that 
transferring technologies to the South will stipulate the South’s demand of carbon energy, 
and hence, the world market price of carbon energy ceteris paribus will rise. 
 12 
This indicates that we will observe both a leakage and rebound effect. This becomes more 
obvious, if we consider condition (3.9). As the second term on the right hand side shows, 
increasing the energy efficiency in the South through technology transfer will stipulate the 
demand for carbon energy, hence will lead to higher carbon emissions in the South. This is 
what the literature calls a rebound effect. 
Recalculation of the first term of equation (3.9) gives 
  , 
and hence, there is leakage. However, the leakage effect does not fully compensate the re-
duction of emissions, the North has decided on in stage 1. Consequently, without technology 
transfer to the South global emissions would be reduced. In other words, the terms-of-trade 
effect solely would not imply that globally accumulated emissions will rise. 
Nonetheless, Kyoto-plus could turn out a bad policy, both for the global climate and the 
North. First, the leakage and the rebound effect together may wipe out the mitigation ef-
forts of the North. This might result in higher global greenhouse gas emissions than without 
the policy intervention of the North (see condition (3.9)). Second, while the North has to 
bear the costs of greenhouse gas abatement, eventually without gaining benefit from a re-
duction of climate damages, this could negatively affect the North’s welfare. Therefore, let 
us consider stage 1 and discuss: (1) Which conditions grant that global emissions will fall de-
spite of technology transfers to the South? (2) Under which conditions is Kyoto-plus Pareto 
improving?  
First, suppose . This requires (see (3.9)) 
  ,  
hence  
(3.10) . 
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Therefore there is an upper limit on North-to-South technology transfer, which depends on 
the net-effect of the emission reduction policy of the North as well as the impact of technol-
ogy transfers on carbon inputs in the South. Or to phrase it differently, the smaller is the 
leakage effect and the smaller is the rebound effect, the more technology can be transferred 
to the South, without increasing global greenhouse gas emissions.7
Note further, if , conditions (3.8) and (3.10) imply that . Or to put it different-
ly, leakage and rebound effects are not strong enough such that there will be no impact on 
world market prices of carbon energy.  
 
Next, let us discuss the second question from above. Condition (2.3) implies 
, 
or because of conditions (3.1) and (3.2) as well as the assumption:  
(3.11)  
(3.12)  
Now suppose that technology transfers are low enough such that condition (3.10) is fulfilled. 
Then the impact of North-to-South transfers on world market prices is negligible, and the 
South in any case can profit, since , . If, however, condition (3.10) is not 
satisfied, then world market prices of carbon energy will rise and the South will profit for 
sure only, if the North is net-importer and the South is net-exporter of carbon energy. 
Under Kyoto-plus assumptions the North has for economic reasons almost no incentive at all 
to transfer technologies to the South. As condition (3.12) indicates, the North could profit 
only, if the price effect is negative and if the leakage effect is moderate. This represents a 
dilemma. Even if (3.10) is fulfilled, and hence global emissions drop, condition (3.12) implies 
                                                 
7  Using conditions (3.5) and (3.6) this gives .  I.e., the upper limit on technology trans-
fer depends on the marginal rate of substitution between technology and energy on the one hand and 
energy consumption as well as marginal damages on the other. 
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  , 
which is negative because of leakage (see (3.9)). 
3.1.2 Kyoto-reversed  
Under Kyoto-reversed assumptions the duty of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is shifted 
from Annex I to non-Annex I countries. That means, in the first stage the North decides to 
transfer technologies, while the South commits itself on climate mitigation. Hence, at begin-
ning of stage 2 technology transfers  as well as changes in the South’s input of carbon 
energy  are given.8
(3.7a) . 
 Therefore, condition (3.1) together with the market clearance condi-
tion (2.2) after some manipulations now gives 
By using Cramer’s rule we get 
(3.8a) . 
which, because of , implies falling prices, if the South reduces emissions. 
Falling prices ceteris paribus stipulate rising demand for carbon energy in the North. Indeed, 
from (3.7a) by applying Cramer’s rule again we obtain 
(3.9a) , 
which means that now emissions in the North will rise, if emissions in the South are reduced. 
However, the increase will be less than unity such that accumulated emissions nonetheless 
will fall. 
                                                 
8  Obviously, this creates a participation problem. We will return to this issue in the conclusions.  
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Finally, let us discuss, how regional consumption changes under Kyoto-reversed assump-
tions. Conditions (2.3), (3.1) and (3.2) as well as  imply 
(3.11a)   
(3.12a)   
If, as was supposed above, the North is net-importer of carbon energy and the South is net 
exporter, then the South nonetheless might profit, provided technology transfer is high 
enough. The North in any case can profit for at least two reasons. (1) Climate change dam-
ages are reduced, as the first term on the side of condition (3.12a) shows. (2) The world 
market prices of carbon energy will fall because of terms of trade effects. 
3.2 Pareto-efficient strategies 
Now, assume that regions cooperate and that international cooperation results in a Pareto-
efficient solution of the global climate problem. Again we apply a two stage game. In stage 1 
the North decides on investing into its own technology stock and/or on transferring technol-
ogy to the South. In stage 2 regions cooperatively decide on mitigation. Since by assumption 
climate change does not directly affect utilities and regional welfare depends on conven-
tional consumption only, the regions’ consumption (see (2.3)) again is taken as proxy of re-
gional welfare. Then for a Pareto-efficient allocation  
   
has to be maximized subject to the market constraint (2.2). This gives the following first or-
der conditions 
(3.16)  , 
(3.17)  . 
These conditions immediately imply 
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(3.18)  , 
which means that the green marginal productivity of energy has to be equal across regions. 
This is in some contrast to the results reported in the literature (for example, see Chichilnisky 
and Heal, 1994), where it is typically argued that without income transfers the marginal 
costs of abatement will not be the same across all regions. It is, however, consistent with the 
results shown in Manne and Stephan (2005). 
To provide the basis for further investigation let us take the total differential of condition 
(3.18). Since  (see condition (2.1)), this gives 
(3.19)  , 
where  denotes the change of the technology stock of region n = N,S. 
Note, the right hand side of condition (3.19) denotes, how a change in the regions’ technol-
ogy stocks affects the interregional differential in green marginal productivity of energy. In 
optimum green marginal productivity has to be identical across regions (see condition 
(3.18)). Therefore, if technology transfers force the regions’ green marginal productivity of 
energy to differ, there must be some correction through a change in inputs of carbon ener-
gy. To see this, let us first concentrate on the case that technology is transferred from the 
North to the South only, i.e., . Obviously, the effect, transferring technolo-
gies has on global emissions, depends on the sign of the first expression in brackets on the 
left side of equation (3.19). If 
  , 
then transferring technologies to the South implies an reduction of global emissions. Or, 
since  
(3.20)  
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Now, under realistic assumptions one would not expect that condition (3.20) is satisfied for 
the following reasons: (1) Economies of the South typically consume less carbon energy than 
those in the North. Therefore the marginal productivity of energy in the South should be 
higher than in the North. (2) Due to their higher exposure marginal damages of global warm-
ing change are higher in the South than in the North. Therefore, the expression of the right 
side of condition (3.20) is expected to be bigger than 1, which contradicts condition (3.20). 
One consequence is that the chronological ordering matters. Transferring technologies first 
and then deciding cooperatively on climate change mitigation does not imply higher levels of 
greenhouse gas abatement compared to a situation without technology transfers. What, 
however, if the North not only transfers technologies, but also invests in its own technology 
stocks such that the expression on the right hand side of condition (3.19) gets negative? 
Then a reduction of global greenhouse gas emission under full cooperation is observed, if  
   
And hence 
(3.20a)  
This fits with reality at least as long as the marginal productivity of energy is lower in the 
North than in the South, but marginal damages are higher in the South than in the North.  
4 Conclusions 
Can technology transfer be a complement or a substitute for internationally coordinated 
climate policy? As our analysis reveals, neither nor. Even under optimistic assumptions re-
bound and leakage effects hinder a sustainable and welfare improving solution of the cli-
mate problem. What turns out being a suitable option both in terms of regional welfare and 
climate change mitigation is imposing binding emission targets in the South and transferring, 
as kind of compensation, energy-efficient technologies from the industrialized to the devel-
oping countries. However, this is not really a novelty and it is not good news in addition. It 
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immediately raises a compliance and commitment problem. Why should the South contri-
bute to greenhouse gas abatement, once the technologies are transferred? One idea could 
be that technologies are transferred only, once the South established a reliable climate 
change policy, for example through implementing a carbon tax. This implies that the chrono-
logical ordering of policy steps is reversed compared to the scenarios discussed today, for it 
requires that there will be some reliable commitment for greenhouse gas abatement, before 
technologies are transferred.  
The last observation not only applies in case of uncoordinated, unilateral climate policies. It 
also applies if cooperative climate policies are considered. If technologies are transferred 
from North to South first, and Pareto-efficient climate abatement is determined second, the 
flow of emissions is higher compared to a situation where emission targets are negotiated 
first and technologies are transferred second. This seriously challenges the idea that North-
to-South technology transfer might be an isolated option. Technology transfer can be coun-
terproductive unless countries face binding emission constraints, and hence should be part 
of a broader policy package. For given their need for continued economic growth, develop-
ing countries are unlikely to agree on constraining emissions without compensation from the 
developed countries. Technology transfer provides such form of compensation (see Popp, 
2009), however. 
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Appendix 
Section 3.1.1 
Taking the total differential of condition (3.1) as well as of the market condition (2.2) leads 
to the following system of linear equations 
 . 
Multiplying the second row with  gives (3.7). 
Section 3.1.2 
Taking the total differential of condition (3.1) gives  
 . 
Assume that  and that  is given 
(A.1)  
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By multiplying the second row with  and the third one with 
 gives 
(A.1.1)   
For applying Cramer’s rule, let us calculate the determinante of the above matrix, which is 
. 
   
   
  . 
